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ABSTRACT: The recently experienced Swazi fiscal crisis of 2011 has facilitated the need for 
an academic probe into the sustainability of fiscal budgets in the Kingdom. Against the absence 
of empirical evidence evaluating the sustainability of Swazi fiscal budget, our study fills the 
hiatus by econometrically evaluating the sustainability of the fiscal budget of the Swazi 
economy between 1999 and 2016. Our empirical study depends on a combination of linear and 
asymmetric unit root and cointegration empirical procedures to attain this objective. In 
reviewing the obtained results, the evidence obtained from the linear econometric frameworks 
is inconclusive whereas the results from the more vigorous asymmetric models point to the 
unsustainability of Swazi fiscal budget over both the short and long-run. Important policy 
implications for Swazi fiscal policymakers are drawn from the analysis. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The Kingdom of Swaziland is a small, landlocked monarchy situated in the South East 
parts of the African continent and is host to a population of under 1.4 million people. 
Geographically, the country measures 17,364 km2 (6,704mi2) in landscape and is completely 
surrounded by South Africa to the Northern parts (Hhohho district), Western parts (Manzini 
district), Southern parts (Shiselweni district) yet share borders with the Southern province of 
Mozambique on the Eastern parts (Lubombo district). Economically, Swaziland is heavily 
dependent on South Africa, particularly in the area of trade activity, in which together with 
Namibia, Botswana and Lesotho operate under the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) 
Free Trade Area (FTA) agreements. Part of the stipulations of these FTA agreements are that 
revenues collected and deposited into a common pool from trade receipts are distributed 
amongst the member states using a revenue sharing formula. What facilitates the ease of trade 
transaction amongst the countries is that they share borders with South Africa hence warranting 
much flexibility in free movement of capital and labour. Moreover, with the exception of 
Botswana, the remaining SACU members operate under a Common Monetary Area (CMA) 
which significantly reduces transactions costs in exchanging currency across borders.   
 
The Swazi Kingdom was hit by a severe budget crisis in 2011 which saw the local 
budget deficit almost double from 7% of GDP to 13% of GDP between the fiscal years of 
2009/10 and 2011/12, whilst increasing debt levels from 12.5% of GDP to 17% of GDP 
between the same periods (Mafusire, 2015). The budget crisis is alluded to the massive 
downturn in Southern African Customs Union (SACU) revenues which plummeted from 24% 
of GDP in 2008/09 to 9.7% of GDP in 2010/11. The sharp declines in SACU revenues were 
very problematic for Swazi policymakers as these revenues constitute a major portion of fiscal 
collections which are specifically used to finance the Kingdom’s large public wage bill. Further 
given limited access to other financing options, the Swazi government faced a serious liquidity 
shortage which threatened the solvency of the fiscal budget. According to a 2012 technical 
report compiled by the United Nations, the main transmission channels of the crisis into the 
Swazi economy were via i) reduced social services delivery  ii) weakened labour markets, and 
iii) vulnerable credit markets. In turn, the deeper social repercussions of the crisis included i) 
layoffs and wage cuts ii) social expenditure cuts iii) poor access to health care and education 
service iv) decreased quality and quantity of nutritional intake v) increased school dropouts 
and crime rates (United Nations, 2012).  
 
As a result of it’s severity, the Swazi budget crisis of 2010-2011 attracted much required 
assistance from the international community, more especially from the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), who have worked hand-in-hand with Swazi domestic authorities to pave a way 
towards increased budget sustainability. As part and parcel of these collaborations, a number 
of academics from the African Research Department of the IMF (see Mongardini et al. (2011) 
and Basdevant et al. (2011, 2013)) have produced a series of research papers on the effects of 
the budget crisis on the Swazi economy. Collectively, the aforementioned research case studies 
carry two common themes. Firstly, the influence of monetary policy in stabilizing the economy 
is greatly hindered due to the affiliation of the Swazi economy to the Common Monetary Area 
(CMA) agreements. Under these agreements, the Swazi Lilangeni currency is pegged of equal 
value onto the South Africa Rand, all at the expense of independent conduct of domestic 
monetary policy. Secondly, with the failure of the proposed IMF staff monitoring programme 
(SMP) in meeting the requirements to obtain a letter of comfort directed at securing external 
funding from international institutions such as the African Development Bank (AFDB), the 
most immediate concerns of the Swazi government should be with implementing deep fiscal 
structural reforms.  
 
Against these developments, a fundamentally important empirical question which can 
be raised is whether the Swazi fiscal budget is sustainable or not? After conducting a rigorous 
review of the available literature, we observe that no previous research has attempted to 
empirically address this question for the case of Swaziland. Another important question which 
can be posed is ‘what course of action should Swazi fiscal authorities embark on towards 
attaining improved budget sustainability over both long and the short-run?’ Should the 
government focus on expanding the fiscal budget or should it rather concentrate on contracting 
the budget? Unfortunately, symmetric econometric models, which assume that both increases 
and decreases in the fiscal budget adjustments have similar magnitude effects on sustainability 
over the steady state, fail to appropriately address this issue. Therefore, our study contributes 
to the paradigm by examining the sustainability of the Swazi fiscal budget using symmetric 
and asymmetric unit root testing procedures and cointegration methods applied to time series 
data collected between 1999 and 2016. In particular, preliminary evidence on the sustainability 
of the fiscal budget is provided by the conventional symmetric ADF and DF-GLS unit root 
tests which is supplemented with a cointegration analysis using the symmetric autoregressive 
distributive lag (ARDL) model of Pesaran et al. (2001). A comparative analysis is thereafter 
provided by the asymmetric unit root testing procedure of Kapetanios et al. (2003) which is 
augmented with a Fourier function as well as by the nonlinear autoregressive distributive lag 
(N-ARDL) model of Shin et al. (2014). Given the robustness of our empirical strategy in 
examining the sustainability of the Swazi budget, we believe that our empirical study could 
provide useful ramifications for Swazi fiscal authorities. 
 
Having provided a background to the research, the remainder of the study is presented 
as follows. The following section provides an overview of the Swazi economy and the 2011 
fiscal crisis. The third section presents a brief review of the associated empirical literature.  
Section four presents our methodology which constitutes of our theoretical framework, the unit 
root testing framework as well as the cointegration frameworks used in our empirical study. 
Section five presents the data and empirical results whilst section six concludes the paper in 
the form of policy implications.  
 
2 A SNAPSHOT OF THE SWAZI ECONOMY AND THE FISCAL CRISIS 
 
In order to reasonably appreciate the severity of the fiscal budget crisis on the Swazi 
nation, it is imperative that one first possess an economic background to the Kingdom. It is 
well documented that over the last decade or so, the Swazi economy has been growing at a 
sluggish two percent growth rate which is described as being amongst the lowest in the SSA 
region (Mongardini et al., 2011). In addition, the unemployment rate has averaged about 29 
percent and it is believed that over 69 percent of the population lives below the poverty line of 
one dollar a day (Masuku and Limb, 2016). Per capita income was estimated at US$3,000, the 
economy ranks 148 out of 187 on the United Nations Human Poverty Index and the country’s 
Gini coefficient of 0.51 is one of the highest in the world (Woods, 2015). From a health 
perspective, the country boasts one of the highest HIV prevalence rates globally, which has 
been labelled as an epidemic and according to the World Bank statistics, the life expectancy of 
Swazi citizens is approximately 49 years (Brixiova et al., 2013).  
 
As is the case with many Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) economies, a number of public 
enterprises have been established in key sectors of the Swazi economy in order to spearhead 
development and provide a variety of goods and services (Dlamini, 2003). In particular, a 
special development fund organization, Tibiyo Taka Ngwane, which holds a significant portion 
of the nation’s wealth, provides much of the infrastructure, such as urban water supply, 
electricity, telecommunications and postal services, rail and air transport and the agro-industrial 
services (Dlamini, 2005). In addition, Tibiyo uses its generated investment income as resources 
to purchase large equity stakes (usually 50% interest) in the most significant foreign investment 
ventures into the Kingdom which is inclusive of asbestos, casinos, construction, food and meat 
processing, hotels, banks, insurance, sugar and other agribusiness, mines and timber (Debly, 
2014). From a trade perspective, textiles and sugar processing form a major bulk of the 
Kingdom’s exports to international destinations such as the United States (US) and the 
European Union (EU) and consequentially account for a majority of Swaziland’s government 
revenue from SACU receipts. 
 
Due to the dominance of state ownership of factors of production with government 
being the largest employer of labour, a majority of ordinary Swazi citizens have to earn a living 
by either engaging in small and medium enterprise opportunities or work directly in the public 
sector (Humayun and Adelopo, 2012). This has resulted in a very large public wage bill in 
Swaziland which is reported to be the highest worldwide, averaging 50% of total fiscal 
revenues and 17% of GDP between 2010 and 2011, and is primarily financed through revenues 
collected from the SACU common revenue pool (CRP) (United Nations, 2012). In 2002, there 
was a change in the revenue sharing formula which had been criticized on the premise of 
reflecting colonialist ideologies of South Africa’s previous Apartheid regime. The new 
agreement sought to encompass i) democratization and the creation of new governing 
institutional structures ii) trade liberalization and regulation as well as iii) a new revenue 
sharing formula for the SACU-CRP funds (Gibbs, 2002). Initially, trade revenues generated 
under the new agreements were exceptionally favourable towards smaller SACU countries 
(Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland) especially between the fiscal period of 2004/5 and 2007/8, 
in which Swaziland’s share in revenues amounted to 39.4% of total government income and 
also 26.7% of GDP in 2006/07. In a twist of events, Swaziland’s share in SACU revenues 
plummeted from 20.4% of GDP in 2009/10 to 9.5% of GDP in 2010/11 (United Nations, 2012) 
and this has being mainly attributed to the Lehman bankruptcy which sparked the global 
financial crisis of 2008, the global recessionary period of 2009 as well as the European 
sovereign debt crisis of 2010. By 2011 the external current account deficit reached 
approximately 18% of GDP, the international reserves had depleted to a meagre R4,5 billion 
(under $500 million) and this had crippled government service delivery for many state 
departments (Simelane, 2014). In response to the looming fiscal liquidity crunch facing 
Swaziland, the local government attempted to finance it’s fiscal budget by drawing deposits at 
the Central Bank, engaging in significant domestic borrowing and accumulating of significant 
domestic payment arrears, and this set course of action only worsened the economic situation 
in Swaziland (Simelane, 2016). 
 
In running out of options, the government sought to obtain R600 million from the 
African Development Bank (AFDB) and due to the perceived, unfavourable credibility of the 
Swazi government in repaying back this loan, the AFDB requested a letter of comfort from the 
IMF. A team of delegates, led by Dr. Joannes Mongardini, was then dispatched by the IMF and 
this advisory team recommended that the Swazi government embark on a fiscal adjustment 
roadmap (FAR) whose aim was to restore domestic fiscal sustainability over the short-to-
medium term and to institute deeper structural fiscal reforms as a long-term development 
objective. As part of this policy programme, the staff monitoring programme (SMP) was 
introduced through a series of fiscal reforms which were implemented in attempt to consolidate 
the deteriorating budget. On the revenues side of the budget, there was an increase levy on 
gasoline and fuel; a proposed increase in excise duties on alcohol and cigarettes; an increase in 
sales tax and the introduction of the value added tax (VAT), all which were forecasted to bring 
in significant revenue collections to fiscal authorities. On the expenditure side, there was a 
decision taken to stop all new budget commitments, except for health and education items, as 
well as significant cuts to the public wage bill. Overall, there was an encompassing fiscal 
mandate to reduce the threshold ceiling of the domestic debt from 40% of GDP to 25% of GDP 
(United Nations, 2012).   
 
However, in 2012, the IMF abruptly ended its collaborations with the Swazi 
government and withdrew its advisory team, claiming that it was unable to support the 
government proposed reform agenda because it did not go far enough in addressing deeper 
socio-political structural reforms (Wood, 2015). In particular, the IMF explicitly expressed 
serious concerns over Tibiyo’s tax exempt status, of which if taxed, the institution would be 
largest contributors of tax payments to the country’s revenues collections (Debly, 2014). The 
Swazi government did not take too kindly to these political-based recommendations and 
requested the IMF to stop meddling in the country’s affairs. Subsequently, the Swazi fiscal 
budget did improve in 2012, and yet has since deteriorated to levels worse than experienced in 
2010/2011, reaching 1over 16% of GDP in the most recent fiscal year of 2016/17 (Mafusire, 
2015). Much of the recent dismal fiscal performance comes courtesy of the El-Nino induced 
drought of 2015 and according to a 2016 report published by the Deputy Prime Minister’s 
office, Swaziland drought assessment rainfall decreased by over 50% with the agribusiness 
suffering significant losses in sugarcane, maize and vegetation production and this has had 
spillover effects into households via increased food deficits. The Swazi government has since 
launched the long-term National Emergency Response, Mitigation, and Adaptation Plan 
(NERMAP) which has developed a contingency response plans for i) agriculture and food 
security ii) education iii) water and sanitation iv) health and nutrition sector v) social protection 
vi) storm damages and vii) co-ordination of drought mitigation and adaptation plan, as well as 
vii) storm damages response, all of which has already set the government budget back by R345 
363 948 (approximately US$29 033 503) (United Nations, 2016).  
 
3 REVIEW OF ASSOCIATED LITERATURE 
 
There has been a considerable large volume of previous empirical literature which has 
examined the sustainability of fiscal budgets for European economies (Owoye (1995), Koren 
and Stiassny (1998), Garcia and Henin (1999), Afonso and Rault (2009), Lau and Baharumshah 
(2009), Holmes et al. (2010), Cuestas and Staehr (2013) and Bolat (2014)), Latin American 
countries (Baffes and Shah (1994), Ewing and Payne (1998) and Cheng (1999)), Asian 
economies (Karim et al. (2006), Mehrara et al. (2011) and Magazzino (2014)) and other African 
countries (Carneiro et al. (2005), Eita and Mbazima (2008), Ghartey (2010) and Baharumshah 
et al. (2016)). Collectively, these studies produce a wide range of differing empirical results 
mainly due to differences in the measure of the fiscal budget, different econometric 
methodologies applied, differing time spans covered as well as differing country-specific 
dynamics.  
 
In categorizing these studies, it is most convenient to broadly segregate them into two 
groups. Firstly, there are studies which rely on testing the integration properties of the balanced 
budget (Cunado et al. (2004), Lau and Baharumshah (2009), Holmes et al. (2010) and Liu et 
al. (2014)). The intuition behind these studies is that government’s budget is deemed 
sustainable if the series is found to be stationary since a shock to the budget will eventually 
revert the variable back to it’s steady state equilibrium. This evidence is supported by Cunado 
et al. (2004) for the US and Holmes et al. (2010) for EU economies. Conversely, the fiscal 
budget is considered unsustainable if the time series is found to contain a unit root since this 
implies a shock to the budget permanently deviates from it’s steady-state equilibrium such that 
it’s predictability does not tend to an average value. This evidence of a non-stationary fiscal 
budget process is supported by Lau and Baharumshah (2009) for 10 Asian countries and Liu 
et al. (2014) for China’s provinces. 
 
Secondly, there are studies which rely on cointegration methods to examine the 
sustainability of the balance budget (see Baffes and Shah (1994), Owoye (1995), Ewing and 
Payne (1998), Koren and Stiassny (1998), Garcia and Henin (1999), Cheng (1999), Carneiro 
et al. (2005), Karim et al. (2006), Eita and Mbazima (2008), Afonso and Rault (2009), Ghartey 
(2010), Mehrara et al. (2011), Bolat (2014), Magazzino (2014) and Baharumshah et al. (2016)). 
According to this second group of studies, the fiscal budget is considered highly sustainable if 
the long-run elasticity between government revenues and spending is equal to unity. On the 
other hand, when the long-run revenue-spending elasticity is below unity, and particularly as 
it approaches zero, the fiscal budget is considered unsustainable, such that along such a steady-
state path government is unable to finance its future spending items without running a Ponzi 
scheme of ‘bubble’ financing its expenditure by issuing debt to finance the deficits (Lau and 
Baharumshah, 2009).  
 
However, a majority of these previous studies assume linearity in the evolution of the 
fiscal budget. According to Ewing et al. (2006), Paleologou (2013) and Phiri (2018), the 
proposition of linearity in fiscal sustainability may be flawed on the grounds of i) policymakers 
reacting differently to changes the budget deficit or surplus ii) the variation in taxpayers 
responses to changes in the effective tax rate of base iii) the closeness between the budget and 
the business cycle, in which the business cycle evolves in an asymmetric fashion. 
Consequentially, a handful of more recent conducted studies have assumed asymmetries in the 
budget sustainability by either employing nonlinear unit root testing procedures (see Arestis et 
al. (2004) for the US, Bajo-Rubio et al. (2004) for Spain, Chortareas et al. (2008) for Latin 
America and Caribbean countries and Ono (2008) for G7 countries) or nonlinear cointegration 
frameworks (Ewing et al. (2006) for the US, Payne et al. (2008) for Turkey, Zapf and Payne 
(2009) for the US, Saunoris and Payne (2010) for the UK, Young (2011) for the US, Apergis 
et al. (2012) for Greece, Paleologou (2013) for Sweden, Greece and Germany as well as Phiri 
(2018) for South Africa).  
 
Nonetheless, the presented literature on the nonlinearity of fiscal budget sustainability, 
commonly suffer from two main empirical shortcomings. For starters, a majority of studies 
which employ nonlinear cointegration methods tend to rely on the momentum threshold 
autoregressive (MTAR) model of Enders and Siklos (2001) which assumes asymmetric in the 
equilibrium adjustment process and yet retains linearity in the levels relationship of the time 
series (Ewing et al. 92006), Payne et al. (2008), Zapf and Payne (2009), Saunoris and Payne 
(2010), Young (2011), Apergis et al. (2012), Paleologou (2013), Phiri (2018)). However, as 
conveniently noted by Athanasenas et al. (2014), these symmetric models may be simplifying 
the issue by account for asymmetries over the short-run yet ignoring possible asymmetries over 
the long-run steady state of the variables. Moreover, and to the best of our knowledge, no 
previous studies have applied both unit root and cointegration approaches, in a nonlinear 
context, to examining the sustainability of fiscal budgets. Conducting an empirical study of 
such nature would add vigour to the empirical analysis of the sustainability of fiscal budgets 
for the Swazi economy of which there currently exists no empirical evidence. 
 
4 METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Theoretical framework 
 
From a modelling perspective, the sustainability of the fiscal budget can be evaluated 
through the following present value fiscal borrowing constraint: 
 
EXPt + (1 + rt) BUDt = REVt + BUDt      (1) 
 
 Where EXPt is government expenditure, REVt is government revenues, BUDt is 
government debt whereas rt is the real interest rate which is assumed to be stationary around 
it’s mean, it. In recursively solving equation (1) for infinite future period’s results in the 
following intertemporal budget constraint: 
 
BUDt = σ
𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡+𝑠 − 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑡+𝑠
ς (1 + 𝑟𝑡+𝑗)
𝑠
𝑗=1
∞
𝑠=1 + lim
𝑠→∞
൬
𝐵𝑈𝐷𝑡+𝑠
1 + 𝑟𝑡+𝑠
൰
⬚
     (2) 
 
From equation (2), a sufficient and necessary condition for budget sustainability to hold 
is that the current value of outstanding government debt is equal to the present value of future 
budget surplus streams i.e. 
  
 
lim
𝑠→∞
൬
𝐵𝑈𝐷𝑡+𝑠
1 + 𝑟𝑡+𝑠
൰
⬚
= 0         (3) 
 
 Empirical studies tend to test the limiting condition presented in equation (3), by either 
examining whether the fiscal budget evolves as a stationary, I(0) process, or whether 
government expenditures and revenues are cointegrated through the following steady-sttate 
regression: 
 
REVt = 0 + βEXPt + et        (4) 
 
Where 0 is regression intercept, et is a N(0,σ2)  disturbance term and β the long-run 
regression coefficient which measures the sustainability of the fiscal budget. The rule of thumb 
is that the budget is highly sustainable if β = 1, and as β approaches zero, then government 
debts becomes increasing unsustainable such that the intertemporal budget constraint (3) is less 
likely to hold. 
 
4.2 Unit root testing framework 
 
Our first empirical approach to examining the fiscal sustainability in Swaziland, is to 
test for unit roots on the fiscal budget process. Note that from equation (4), one is able to 
express the fiscal budget as BUDt = REVt - GOVt, which, in turn, can be further expressed the 
following autoregressive process:  
 
BUDt = iBUDt-1 + et         (5) 
 
 An alternative and more convenient expression for equation (5) in testing for the 
presence of unit roots in the fiscal budget would be via the following Dickey-Fuller type 
regression: 
 BUDt = ψiBUDt-1 + et        (6) 
 
Where ψi = i - 1 and the unit root hypothesis is tested as H0: ψi = 0 which is tested 
against the alternative hypothesis of a stationary time series (i.e. H1: ψi < 0). The augmented 
version of the Dickey-Fuller test (i.e. ADF) includes lagged first difference variables which are 
used to correct for serial correlation i.e.  
 
BUDt = ψiBUDt-1 +σ 
𝑖
𝐵𝑈𝐷𝑡−𝑖
𝑝
𝑗=1  + et      (7) 
 
 The ADF tests statistic is computed as the t-statistic of the estimated regression (7) i.e. 
 
tADF = 
𝜓෡
𝑆.𝐸.(𝜓෡ )
          (8) 
 
 Where 𝜓෠ is the estimated value of ψ and S.E.( 𝜓෠) is the standard error of 𝜓෠. The unit 
root null hypothesis of can only be rejected if the computed test statistic is smaller than the 
critical values reported in McKinnon (1996). However, conventional linear unit root testing 
procedures have come under heavy criticism by authors such as Enders and Granger (1998) 
and Caner and Hansen (2001), who have argued that symmetric unit root testing frameworks 
sacrifice a considerable amount of testing power if the underlying data generating process of 
the time series is indeed nonlinear. One popular alternative which emerged in the literature, 
came about as courtesy of Kapetanios et al. (2003) who extended the DF testing procedure into 
the following exponential smooth transition autoregression (ESTAR) framework: 
 
BUDt = ψiBUDt-1 + [1-exp(-𝑦𝑡−1
2 )]+ σ 
𝑖
𝐵𝑈𝐷𝑡−𝑖
𝑝
𝑗=1  + et   (9) 
  
 Where under the null hypothesis, the fiscal budget follows a stationary process (i.e. H0: 
 = 0) whilst the alternative hypothesis is that the time series evolves as a stationary ESTAR 
model. Since the null hypothesis cannot be directly tested, then Kapetanios et al. (2003) 
suggested that equation 9 can be re-parameterized using a first order Taylor series 
approximation. The following auxiliary unit root testing regression can be derived: 
 
BUDt = i𝐵𝑈𝐷𝑡−𝑖
3
 +σ 
𝑖
𝐵𝑈𝐷𝑡−𝑖
𝑝
𝑗=1  + et      (10) 
 
 The null hypothesis of a linear unit root process can be now tested as H0: i = 0 against 
the alternative of stationary ESTAR process (i.e. H1: i = 0). In similarity to the conventional 
ADF test, the asymptotic critical value of the Kapetanios et al. (2003) unit root test is computed 
as: 
 
tKSS = 
෠
𝑆.𝐸.(෠)
          (11) 
 
 Since the tKSS statistic does not follow an asymptotic standard normal distribution, 
Kapetanios et al. (2003) derive critical values for the test statistics for the test performed on 
raw time series, de-meaned data and de-trended data. One major shortcoming with the KSS 
unit root test is its inability to directly account for structural breaks in the regression. Of recent, 
there has been a growing consensus that a flexible Fourier form (FFF) approximation of unit 
root tests has good size and power properties in detecting a series of unknown smooth structural 
breaks (see Enders and Lee (2012) and Rodrigues and Taylor (2012)). Therefore, in 
augmenting the KSS unit root test using a single frequency Fourier function, the testing 
regression can be specified as:  
 
BUDt = i𝐵𝑈𝐷𝑡−𝑖
3
 +σ 
𝑖
𝐵𝑈𝐷𝑡−𝑖
𝑝
𝑗=1 + 𝑎𝑖 sin ቀ
2𝜋𝐾𝑡
𝑇
ቁ + 𝑏𝑖𝑐𝑜𝑠(
2𝜋𝐾𝑡
𝑇
) + et,   t = 1,2,…,T. 
           (12) 
 
 Where K is the singular approximated frequency selected for the approximation, whilst 
coefficients a and b measure the amplitude and displacement of the sinusoidal. Enders and Lee 
(2012) place emphasis on estimating a Fourier function with a singular frequency to avoid 
problems of over-fitting and loss of regression power. Moreover, Enders and Lee (2012) 
propose that regression (12) be estimated for all integer values of K which lie between the 
interval [1, 5] and selecting the estimation which produces the lowest sum of squared residuals 
(SSR).  
 
4.3 Cointegraton frameowrk 
 
Generally the literature tends to rely on traditional cointegration methods such as those 
presented by Engle and Granger (1987) and Johansen (1991) cointegration analysis (see Baffes 
and Shah (1994), and Ewing and Payne (1998)). However, it has become increasingly 
acknowledged that these method suffer from certain empirical shortcomings such as requiring 
mutual integration of the time series in the cointegration system. Henceforth, the ARDL model 
of Pesaran et al. (2001) has emerged as an attractive alternative in examining cointegration 
relations as the econometric framework does not require the variables to be integrated of similar 
order and can be estimated via a singular reduced form equation. In applying the ARDL model 
with lags (p,q) to our budget constraint, cointegration equation (#) can be re-specified as the 
following empirical regression: 
 
𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡 = 0 + ෍1
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡−𝑗 + ෍1
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑡−𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑡 
(13) 
 
 Where  denotes a first difference operator, 1 and 2 are the short-run coefficient 
parameters, β2 is the long run regression coefficient which is normalized on β1 and et is a 
normally distributed residual term. As a means of testing for cointegration effects Pesaran et 
al. (2001) develop an F-test which evaluates the joint significance of the long-run ARDL 
coefficients. Under the bounds test for cointegration, the null hypothesis of no ARDL 
cointegration effects is formulated as H0: β1 = β2 = 0, and this is tested against the alternative 
of significant cointegration effects (i.e. H1: β1 ≠ β2 ≠ 0). Pesaran et al. (2001) tabulate two sets 
of new critical values of the F-test which accommodate for stationary and difference stationary 
time series. The decision rule is that the ‘no cointegration’ null hypothesis can be only rejected 
if the computed F-statistic exceeds the upper bounds of the critical values. Conversely, if the 
F-statistic falls below the lower critical bound, then the null hypothesis cannot be rejected 
whereas if the F-statistic lies between the lower and upper critical bound values, then the 
evidence is inconclusive. Once cointegration effects are validated, then one can estimate the 
associated unrestricted error correction model (UECM): 
 
𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡 = 0 + σ 1
𝑛
𝑗=1 𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡−𝑗 + σ 1
𝑛
𝑗=1 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑡−𝑗 + 𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡  (14) 
 
 Where ECTt-1 is the error correction term which measure the speed of adjustment back 
to steady-state equilibrium subsequent to a shock to the fiscal budget and ut ~ N(0, 2). 
However, equations # and # assume that the responses of the REVt variable to changes in EXPt. 
As previously discussed, this notion of linearity in the evolution of the fiscal budget is very 
restrictive. In order to circumvent this problem, we follow intuition provided by Shin et al. 
(2014), and decompose the EXPt variable into positive and negative partial sum processes i.e. 
𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑡
+ = σ 𝑖𝑗=1 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑗
+ = σ max𝑖𝑗=1 (EXPj, 0) and 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑡
− = σ 𝑖𝑗=1 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑗
− =
σ min𝑖𝑗=1 (EXPj, 0). Thereafter the N-ARDL (p, q) model can be expressed as the following 
nonlinear function: 
 
𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡 = σ 𝑖𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡−𝑗 + 𝑗
+𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑡−𝑗
+ + 𝑗
−𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑡−𝑗
− +
𝑝
𝑗=1
σ 𝑖𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡−𝑗 +
𝑝−1
𝑗=1
σ (𝑗
+𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑡−𝑗
+ + 𝑗
−𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑡−𝑗
− )
𝑞−1
𝑗=0 + 𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝑡     (15) 
 
 From regression (15), the long-run budgetary elasticities are calculated as β+ = -(+/) 
and β- = -(-/). Before estimating the empirical N-ARDL model we need to test for three 
empirical hypotheses as proposed by Shin et al. (2014). The first hypothesis is a test for N-
ARDL cointegration effects which tests the null hypothesis of symmetric ARDL cointegration 
effects (i.e. H10:  = + = -) against the alternative of asymmetric ARDL effects (i.e. H11:  
≠ + ≠ -). The second pair of hypotheses is concerned with testing for long-run asymmetric 
effects in which the null hypothesis of symmetric long-run ARDL cointegration effects, H20: -
(+/) = -(-/), is tested as which is tested against the alternative of asymmetric long-run 
ARDL effects (i.e. H21: -(+/) ≠ -(-/)). The final pair of hypothesis tested focuses on 
validating short-run asymmetric effects, whereby the null hypothesis of symmetric short-run 
ARDL effects (i.e. σ 𝑗
+𝑞−1
𝑖=0  = σ 𝑗
−𝑞−1
𝑖=0 ) is tested against the alternative of asymmetric short-
run ARDL effects (i.e. σ 𝑗
+𝑞−1
𝑖=0  ≠ σ 𝑗
−𝑞−1
𝑖=0 ).  
  
5 DATA AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
5.1 Empirical data 
 
The data used in our study consists of three time series variables namely i) total 
government expenditure expressed as a ratio of GDP (i.e. EXPt) ii) total revenues collection 
expressed as a ratio of GDP (i.e. REVt) and iii) the balanced budget (i.e. BUDt) which is 
computed as the difference between REVt and EXPt (i.e. BUDt = REVt - EXPt ).  All empirical 
time series data have been collected on annual basis from 1999 to 2016 and this sample size 17 
observations is relatively small for estimation purposes. Therefore all our time series have been 
interpolated from yearly into quarterly data using the Centripetal Catmull-Rom spline method 
hence yielding a total of 68 observations (i.e. 1999:q1 – 2016:q4) which is reasonable for 
empirical use. The basic descriptive statistics of the time series variables are reported in Table 
1 below.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of time series variables 
 REVt EXPt BUDt 
Mean 18.18 23.16 -4.97 
Standard deviation 2.62 5.13 4.75 
J-B 0.84 1.47 0.18 
p-value 0.66 0.48 0.91 
Observations 68 68 68 
 
5.2 Conventional unit root test results 
 Before estimating our nonlinear models, we provide some preliminary evidence from 
conventional unit root and ARDL cointegration analysis. Table 2 presents the results of the 
ADF, PP and DF-GLS unit root tests as performed with i) an intercept and ii) a trend on the 
time series data. The lag length for the ADF and DF-GLS was selected by specifying a 
maximum of 6 lags and trimming these lags down until the AIC, SC and HQ information 
criterion are minimized in the estimated test regression. As can be easily observed from Table 
2, the conducted analysis produces a variety of mixed results. For starters, when the ADF and 
PP tests are performed on the REV variable, with either an intercept a trend, we find that the 
unit root null hypothesis cannot be rejected for the series in its levels and yet manages to 
significantly do so in its first differences, even though the significance of rejection differs at 
critical levels. Nevertheless, when the more powerful DF-GLS test is performed on the levels 
of the REV time series, the unit root null hypothesis cannot be rejected whether the test is 
performed with an intercept or with a trend.  
 
Concerning the EXP variable, the ADF tests fails to reject the unit root hypothesis in 
both the levels and the first differences of the series regardless of whether the test is performed 
with an intercept or a trend. However, when the PP tests are used, either with an intercept or 
trend, the EXP variable rejects the unit root null hypothesis and yet fails to do so in the first 
differences at all critical levels. When the DF-GLS is then performed with an intercept on the 
EXP series, the unit root hypothesis is rejected at a 5 percent critical level. Conversely, when 
a trend is included in the test, the unit root hypothesis is rejected in both the levels and first 
differences of the series.   
 
Lastly, the results of the unit root tests performed on the BUD variable are of particular 
significance for our study. To recall, evidence of a unit root in the fiscal budget is an empirical 
indication of unsustainability in the budget whereas stationary implies sustainability of 
government’s budget. When the ADF test is performed with either an intercept or a trend, we 
find that the Swazi budget is levels stationary at 5 percent and 10 percent critical levels, 
respectively. On the other hand, when the PP test is applied with an intercept, the budget is 
found to be stationary in it’s levels at a 5 percent critical level whereas when a trend is included 
in the test, the unit root hypothesis cannot be rejected in both levels and first differences. 
Finally, when the DF-GLS test is performed on the BUD time series, with either an intercept 
or a trend, the unit root hypothesis is rejected at all critical levels. The overall inconclusiveness 
of the unit root tests for the fiscal budget warrants further deliberation into the time series 
integration properties for the Swazi fiscal budget. 
 
Table 2: Conventional unit root test results 
Unit root test REV EXP BUD 
ADF (intercept) -2.23 
(-3.86)** 
-1.32 
(-2.43) 
-3.28** 
(-3.32)** 
ADF (trend) -2.64 
(-3.66)* 
-2.32 
(-2.33) 
-3.29 
(-3.85)** 
    
PP (intercept) -2.23 
(-4.19)*** 
-1.51 
(-6.21)*** 
-2.52 
(-3.23)** 
PP (trend) -2.76 
(-4.45)** 
-1.05 
(-5.79)*** 
-2.43 
(-3.11) 
    
DF-GLS (intercept) -2.29** 
(-3.57)*** 
-1.88* 
(-3.46)*** 
-3.40*** 
(-3.41)*** 
DF-GLS (trend) -3.07* 
(-3.86)*** 
-2.02) 
(-2.53) 
-3.41** 
(3.49)** 
Note: “***”, “**”, “*” represent the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
 
5.3 Baseline ARDL estimates 
 
One of the most encouraging inferences drawn from our preliminary unit root tests is 
that it presents very little evidence attesting to the time series being integrated of an order I(2) 
or higher. This observation provides sufficient evidence to permit us to utilize the ARDL 
framework in examining the sustainability of the Swazi fiscal budget. As previously discussed, 
this can be achieved by modelling long-run and short-run cointegration relations between fiscal 
revenues and expenditures. However, prior to estimating the ARDL model, we perform the 
bounds test for cointegration and report the empirical results of this exercise in Table 3.  
 
Table 3: Bounds test for cointegration 
Test statistic Value K 
F-statistic 4.0863 1 
   
Critical value bounds I(0) bound I(1) bound 
Significance   
10% 3.02 3.51 
5% 3.62 4.16 
1% 4.94 5.58 
 
In order to choose our appropriate ARDL (p,q) model, we set a maximum of 4 lags on 
both the dependent and independent variable (i.e. p=4, q=4) and trim down to lags in order 
obtain the regression which minimizes the information criterion. Based on the minimization of 
both the AIC and SC information criterion, the selected model is an ARDL (1, 0), which we 
once again attribute to the short length of data utilized in our study. The F-statistic of the ARDL 
bounds test for cointegration produces a value of 4.09 and this statistic exceeds the upper bound 
of the 1(0), 5 percent critical level. Against this evidence of ARDL cointegration, we proceed 
to present the long-run and short-run regression estimates along with their associated diagnostic 
tests which are reported in Table 4. 
 
  
Table 4: ARDL estimates (ARDL(1,0)) 
Variable Coefficient Standard 
deviation 
t-statistics Probability 
Panel A: Long-
run estimates 
    
Rev 0.9704 0.3041 3.1909 0.0188** 
     
Panel B: Short-
run estimates 
    
Rev 0.7961 0.4500 1.7690 0.0987* 
ect(-1) -0.5922 0.2385 -2.4830 0.0263** 
Panel C: 
Diagnostic tests 
    
J-B 0.0823   0.9597 
S-C 2.2593   0.1470 
B-P-G 0.0544   0.8189 
RESET 0.5964   0.5612 
Note: “***”, “**”, “*” represent the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
 
The long-run regression coefficient reported in Panel A of Table 4 produces a value of 
0.97 which is statistically significant at a 5 percent critical level. In realizing that this value is 
relatively close to unity, then we interpret this result to indicate a highly sustainable fiscal 
budget for Swazi policymakers. The ‘close-to-unity’ estimates obtained for the Swazi economy 
is a rather odd finding since they are in contrast to actual developments and furthermore they 
contrast those obtained by Ghartey (2010) for Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa which are 
countries similarly classified as middle-income SSA economies. We thus reserve this issue 
open for further empirical deliberation in the paper. 
 
The short-run regressions coefficient which as reported in Panel B of Table 4 is also 
positive but of a lower magnitude estimate than it’s long-run counterpart (i.e. 0.80) which is 
only significant at a 10 percent level. This later result implies that the Swazi budget is relatively 
unsustainable over the short-run. Furthermore, the error correction coefficient of -0.59 
indicates that in the event of a shock to the fiscal budget, 59 percent of deviations are corrected 
in each period. Therefore disequilibriums are fully corrected within two periods or two years. 
Lastly, we observe that the diagnostic tests reported in Panel C of Table 4 fail to detect any 
evidence of serial correlation, heteroscedasticity and incorrect functional form. The CUSUM 
and CUSUMSQ plots in Figures 1 and 2, respectively, provide supplementary evidence on the 
stability of the estimated regression.  
 
Figure 1: CUSUM plot for ARDL(1,0) model 
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Figure 2: CUSUM of squares plot for ARDL(1,0) model 
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5.4 KSS unit root tests results 
 
Having examined the sustainability of the Swazi fiscal budget from the perspective of 
linear econometric frameworks, we now present the results from the KSS unit root test. We 
firstly conduct the KSS test without a Fourier function and respectively report our empirical 
results on the raw and de-meaned time series in Panels A and B of Table 5. Since the KSS test 
is a nonlinear extension of the ADF test, the choice of correct lag is paramount in conducting 
the test properly. We perform the procedure using lags of 1 to 6, and thereafter base our choice 
of the test statistics upon the test regression which minimizes the AIC, SC and HQ information 
criterion. As can be observed from the reported findings, the optimal lag length of the 
performed tests is 1 for both raw and de-meaned time series and we consider this finding 
plausible on account of the length of the observed time series. 
 
As can be observed from the reported findings in Table 5, the optimal lag length of the 
performed tests is 1 and we consider this finding plausible on account of the length of the 
observed time series. Further note that the produced obtained t-statistics of the tests on the 
Swazi budget in its levels fails to reject the unit root hypothesis when the test is applied to the 
raw data (-1.62) as well as on the de-meaned data (2.69) manage to reject the unit root 
hypothesis at a 10 percent critical level. On the other hand, once these series are transformed 
into first differences, the produced t-statistics exceeds the 1 percent critical level for both the 
raw data (-2.96) and the the de-meaned data (-4.43). However, in light of the inconclusiveness 
of these obtained results of the KSS unit root test on the raw and de-meaned data, we proceed 
to augment the unit root test with a Fourier function.  
 
Table 5: KSS unit root tests results without Fourier function 
Panel A:  
Original data 
  
 Levels  1st differences 
Lag t-statistic AIC SC  t-statistic AIC SC 
        
1 -1.62 6.21 6.31  -2.96*** 6.41 6.51 
2 -1.28 6.41 6.55  -3.05*** 6.48 6.62 
3 -0.82 6.60 6.79  -2.73** 6.71 6.88 
4 -0.56 6.64 6.86  -2.16* 6.98 7.18 
5 -0.15 6.58 6.82  -0.58 7.11 7.33 
6 -0.13 6.94 7.19  -0.84 6.85 7.06 
Panel B:  
De-meaned data 
    
Levels 1st differences 
Lag t-statistic AIC SC  t-statistic AIC SC 
        
1 -2.69* 5.94 6.04  -4.43*** 6.01 6.10 
2 -2.32 6.14 6.28  -3.91*** 6.22 6.36 
3 -1.81 6.36 6.54  -3.44** 6.47 6.64 
4 -0.75 6.57 6.79  -2.96** 6.68 6.88 
5 -0.48 6.44 6.68  -1.89 6.64 6.85 
6 -0.32 6.78 7.04  -1.86 6.29 6.50 
Note: “***”, “**”, “*” represent the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. The 
critical values associated with KSS tests performed on the raw data are -2.82 (1%), -2.22(5%) 
and -1.92 (10%). The critical values associated with KSS tests performed on de-meaned data 
are -3.48 (1%), -2.93 (5%) and -2.66 (10%). 
 
Table 6 reports the findings of the KSS unit root performed with a Fourier function on 
the levels and first differences of the budget series, with the results of the test on the raw data 
presented in Panel A and those for the de-meaned data are presented in Panel B. As previously 
discussed, it is important to for one to identify the optimal frequency, K*, selected for the 
Fourier approximation and as suggested by Enders and Lee (2012), a grid search must be 
performed using values of 1 to 5 for k, with the value which produces the lowest SSR being 
the optimal frequency, K*. As can be observed from Panel A in Table, we obtain optimal values 
of K* = 3 for the raw data in both levels and first differences, with the t-statistic of -1.27 
obtained for the levels failing to reject the unit root null hypothesis at all critical levels whilst 
the t-statistic of -2.80 rejecting the unit root null hypothesis at a 5 percent significance level.  
 
Concerning the results of the de-meaned data presented in Panel B of Table 6, the 
optimum frequency value is 2 for the time series in it’s levels, of which the produced t-statistic 
of -0.30 fails to reject the unit root null hypothesis at all critical levels. Conversely, when the 
time series are differenced, the optimal frequency value becomes 3, and the t-statistic of -3.21 
obtained for the first differences manages to reject the unit root hypothesis at a 5 percent level. 
We therefore, conclude that after controlling for both nonlinearity and unobserved smooth 
structural breaks, the Swazi fiscal budget contains at least one unit root in it’s process and 
significant shocks to the budget, such as those leading to the crisis, are unlikely to return the 
budget back to it’s steady-state equilibrium given the present status quo. 
 
  
Table 6: KSS unit root test with Fourier function 
Panel A: 
Original data 
     
 Levels  1st differences 
K t-stat SSR  t-stat SSR 
1 -1.71 345.41  -2.81** 397.80 
2 -1.05 303.39  -3.16*** 305.78 
3 -1.27 220.39  -2.80** 273.34 
4 -1.65 332.06  -2.54** 391.49 
5 -1.64 329.38  -2.45** 380.06 
Panel B: De-
meaned data 
     
Levels 1st differences 
K      
1 -1.67 182.70  -4.99*** 209.05 
2 -0.30 157.16  -4.32*** 186.46 
3 -0.83 159.19  -3.21** 147.29 
4 -0.67 234.41  -2.39 149.52 
5 -0.42 218.93  -1.07 151.25 
Note: “***”, “**”, “*” represent the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. The 
critical values associated with KSS tests performed on the raw data are -2.82 (1%), -2.22(5%) 
and -1.92 (10%). The critical values associated with KSS tests performed on de-meaned data 
are -3.48 (1%), -2.93 (5%) and -2.66 (10%). 
 
5.5 N-ARDL estimates 
 
In this subsection of the paper, we provide the empirical analysis of the N-ARDL 
model. In setting a maximum lag length of 4, and trimming down the lags, the information 
criterion (i.e. AIC and SC criterion) mutually suggest a lag length of 1 on the dependent 
variable whilst maintaining a zero lag length for the independent variable hence yielding a N-
ARDL (1, 0, 0) specification. 
 
However, prior to that, we firstly present the results of asymmetric cointegration tests. 
To recall, there are three hypotheses which are tested namely i) tests for overall asymmetric 
ARDL cointegration effects ii) tests for long-run asymmetry effects iii) tests for short-run 
asymmetry effects. As shown in the reported results in Table 7, the null hypotheses of no N-
ARDL cointegration effects, no long-run asymmetric effects and no short-run asymmetry 
effects are all significantly rejected since the produced test statistics of 7.13, 14.62, 5.13 and 
22.75, all exceed their respective critical values. 
 
Table 7: Symmetry tests for N-ARDL model 
Test Asymmetric ARDL 
effects 
Long-run N-ARDL 
effects 
Short-run N-ARDL 
effects 
Null hypothesis  = + = - -(+/) = -(-/) σ 𝑗
+𝑞−1
𝑖=0  = σ 𝑗
−𝑞−1
𝑖=0  
    
Test statistic 7.13 14.62 27.75 
    
Critical values Upper I(1) bound  Lower I(0) bound 
10% 4.78  4.04 
5% 5.73  4.94 
1% 7.84  6.84 
Note: All critical values are derived from Peseran et al. (2001) as suggested by Shin et al. 
(2014) 
 
Table 8 presents the results of the long-run, short-run and the residual diagnostic tests 
on our estimated asymmetric cointegration regression. Panel A reports the long-run asymmetric 
regression coefficients. The estimate obtained for EXP+ variable is 0.57 whilst that for the 
EXP- variable is 0.85 and notably both coefficient estimates are statistically significant at a 5 
percent critical level. By interpretation, these reported coefficients imply that a percentage 
increase in the contribution of government expenditure in GDP, only raises the share of 
revenues in GDP by 0.57 percent, whereas a percent decrease in public expenditure’s share in 
GDP results in a 0.85 percent decrease in the revenues collection. However, we quick to point 
out that since both coefficient estimates are well below unity, then Swazi budget will remain 
unsustainable regardless of whether policymakers choose consolidate the budget by increasing 
expenditure through increased taxes or they opt to reduce expenditures. However, we note that 
the preferred course of action would be for Swazi policymakers to reduce expenditure items 
since the coefficient on the EXP- is of a higher value that on the counterpart EXP+ variable. 
 
In turning to our short-run estimates, we find obtain a negative coefficient of -0.99 for 
the REV- variable whereas a positive coefficient of 4.15 is obtained for the REV- variable, 
and we note that both estimates are significant at all critical levels. By interpretation, this 
implies that over the short-run a 1 percent increase in government expenditure will decrease 
revenues by 0.99 percent whereas a 1 percent decrease public spending will also decrease 
revenues collected by 4.15 percent. We also find a highly significant error correction estimate 
of -0.95 which indicates that 95 percent of disequilibrium caused by exogenous shocks to the 
fiscal budget are corrected annually. Lastly, the diagnostic tests reported in Panel C of Table 8 
indicate that the residuals extracted from the estimated N-ARDL model do not suffer from non-
normality, serial correlation, heteroscedasticity or incorrect function form. The stability of our 
estimated model is further ensured by the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ plots presented in Figures 
3 and 4, respectively.  
 
  
Table 8: N-ARDL estimates 
Variable Coefficient Standard error t-statistics Probability 
Panel A: Long-
run estimates 
    
Rev+ 0.576531 0.072 7.942 0.0155 
Rev- 0.852890 0.090 9.428 0.0111 
Panel B: Short-
run estimates 
    
Rev+ -0.9917813 0.0687202 -14.432165 0.0048 
Rev- 4.15 0.2668673 15.556671 0.0041 
ect(-1) 0.9578 0.05929 -16.1521 0.0038 
Panel C: 
Diagnostic tests 
    
J-B 0.0159   0.9921 
S-C 0.0465   0.9551 
B-P-G 0.2716   0.9439 
RESET 0.4082   0.7533 
Note: “***”, “**”, “*” represent the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
 
  
Figure 3: CUSUM plot for N-ARDL(1,0,0) model 
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Figure 4: CUSUM of squares plot for N-ARDL(1,0,0) model 
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6 CONCLUSION 
 
The Swazi budget crisis of 2011 has raised serious concerns over the sustainability of 
the Kingdom’s fiscal budget. In this study we empirically examine the sustainability of the 
Swazi fiscal budget using annual data collected from 1999 to 2016. Our empirical analysis is 
conducted over two phases. In the first phase, we implement conventional unit roots on the 
fiscal budget and further estimate a long-run and short-run ARDL cointegration model of fiscal 
expenditures and revenues. The results of these preliminary analysis indicates stationarity in 
the fiscal budget whilst expenditures are found to be highly cointegrated with revenues. 
Collectively these results imply that Swazi authorities have a highly sustainable fiscal budget. 
 
In the second phase of our empirical analysis, we rely on the nonlinear unit root testing 
procedure of Kapetanios et al. (2003) and the N-ARDL cointegration model of Shin et al. 
(2014) to re-assess the preliminary evidence. After controlling for asymmetries, we particularly 
find that the Swazi fiscal budget contains a unit root, a result which challenges the notion of a 
sustainable fiscal budget. Moreover, the N-ARDL further attests to the phenomenon of an 
unsustainability in the fiscal budget as the results confirm a rather weak cointegration relation 
between fiscal expenditures and revenues regardless of whether policymakers decide to reduce 
or increase the budget.  
 
One common finding from our empirical analysis is that a reduction in fiscal budget 
appears to be the best course of action which Swazi policymakers should pursue given the 
current status quo of the Kingdom. However, the recent drought crisis has facilitated the need 
for increased government spending which can be either financed through higher public debt 
levels, increased taxation revenue, decreases in other public expenditure items or though 
international donations. According to our presented results pursuing the first two of these 
alternatives are sure to have undesirable effects on the short-and-long term sustainability of the 
fiscal budget whilst the third alternative will most likely lead to a more deteriorating social 
economy. The obvious way forward for Swazi policymakers out of their fiscal woes would be 
to implement deeper fiscal reforms as has been rightly advised by the international community.  
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